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A Victory for Fairness and Common Sense:
R v Hughes
In 2006 several new offences were added to the Road Traffic Act 1988, one of which
was section 3ZB1. Headed “Causing death by driving: unlicensed, disqualified or
uninsured drivers”, this provides:
A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he causes the death2 of another person
by driving a motor vehicle on a road and, at the time when he is driving, the circumstances
are such that he is . . . (a) . . . driving [without a valid] licence3 . . . (b) . . . driving while
disqualified4 . . . or (c) . . . using a motor vehicle while uninsured5 . . .
The maximum penalty for this offence is two years’ imprisonment.6 In R v Hughes7
the Supreme Court interpreted this in a way which is fairer to the accused than in
previous cases, and in accordance with common sense views of causation. This note
describes the previous position and summarises the Supreme Court’s ruling.
A. CASES PRIOR TO HUGHES
Both the English Court of Appeal and the Scottish High Court had previously
interpreted section 3ZB strictly, such that the prosecution did not require to prove
that the accused’s driving was at fault. Thus in R v Williams,8 in which the accused
had been driving whilst uninsured and without a licence, the prosecution accepted
that no fault whatsoever attached to his manner of driving. The victim had climbed
over the central reservation of a dual carriageway and, without looking, stepped in
front of the accused’s car. According to the Court of Appeal, the meaning to be given
to “causes the death” was dependent on Parliament’s intention in enacting section
3ZB. Referring to the interpretation given to this phrase in relation to the offence of
1 Added by the Road Safety Act 2006, s 21(1), in force from 18 August 2008.
2 Emphasis added.
3 Contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 87(1).
4 Ibid, s 103(1)(b).
5 Ibid, s 143.
6 Or a fine, or both, see Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s 33 and sch 2, para 1.
7 [2013] 1 WLR 2461.
8 [2011] 1 WLR 588.
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“causing death by dangerous driving”,9 the court noted that driving had been held to
be a cause of death in such cases so long as its contribution to the fatality had been
“more than negligible or de minimis”.10 Thus it concluded:11
We do not think that Parliament can have intended any different definition for section
3ZB . . . it is difficult to conceive of any other intention of Parliament than that if a person
drove unlicensed or uninsured, he would be liable for death that was caused by his driving
however much the victim might be at fault; it was therefore sufficient that the cause was not
negligible.
It was therefore open to a jury to hold that the mere fact that a vehicle which was
involved in a fatality was being driven by the accused when he was uninsured (etc)
was a sufficient causal link.
Williams was followed by the Scottish High Court in Rai v HM Advocate.12 The
accused was driving on a motorway when he was both disqualified and uninsured,
having taken the wheel because the designated driver felt tired. It seems that the
victim, who was knocked down and then run over by the accused, had been walking
on the carriageway of the motorway. Several other vehicles drove over his body as it
lay on the road. Rai was convicted under section 3ZB and sentenced to 12 months’
imprisonment. A commentary on this case suggested that the wording of this section
was such that:13
the faultless driver who genuinely forgets to re-insure will be caught by the offence and
possibly liable to custody, if death is caused by the driving in question. A low speed fatal
impact in a case with a child dashing out in front of an uninsured driver will give rise to the
expectation of custody in certain quarters, even for a first offender who inadvertently forgot
to re-insure. Equally, the disqualified driver, for whom the public will have less sympathy,
merely sitting waiting at traffic lights who is himself the subject of a fatal rear end shunt is
caught by the offence, simply by being on the road, even if the deceased in the car behind
was drunk, driving dangerously, or, in an extreme case, in the act of committing suicide.
B. R V HUGHES: COURT OF APPEAL
The English Court of Appeal also followed Williams in R v Hughes.14 The accused
was involved in a collision with a car being driven by a Mr Dickinson, as a result of
which the latter was fatally injured. On the day of the collision, the deceased had
completed eight consecutive 12-hour night shifts and had driven 200 miles. He had
also taken heroin shortly before the accident and had methadone and benzodiazepine
in his system; according to a toxicologist, such drugs cause “drowsiness, inability to
9 Road Traffic Act 1988 s 1.
10 R v Williams [2011] 1 WLR 588 at para 33 per Thomas LJ, referring to R v Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER
133.
11 Williams at paras 33-34.
12 [2011] HCJAC 105, [2012] SCL 283.
13 Rai v HM Advocate [2012] SCL 283 at 290.
14 [2011] EWCA Crim 1508.
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concentrate and a lack of co-ordination.”15 A witness who had been driving behindMr
Dickinson testified that the latter had been “weaving from side to the road, crossing
the white lines at the nearside . . . , and crossing the central white lines by about 1 foot
. . . for 2 miles immediately prior to the collision.”16
The Recorder who heard the case at first instance rejected the prosecution’s
argument that the accused could be found to have caused Mr Dickinson’s death
“simply by being on that part of the road when the deceased –whilst under the
influence of drugs – drove on to the wrong side of the road and into collision with
the defendant.”17 He stated:18
I cannot accept that the English language can be so contorted to give such a meaning to the
word ‘cause’. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the transitive verb ‘to cause’ as ‘to be
the cause of; to effect, bring about, produce, induce, make.’ In my judgment that requires
some activity, not passivity, on the part of the person said to be doing the causing.
The Court of Appeal accepted that “There is no dispute that the [accused’s] manner
of driving was faultless and the death had nothing at all to do with the manner of his
driving.”19 Nevertheless, it interpreted section 3ZB to require conviction.
The only purpose of such an approach is one of general deterrence; indeed, the
court in Williams referred to the offence as “a harsh and punitive measure with an
evident deterrent element”.20 Parliament’s rationale, therefore, was that individuals
would be less likely to drive whilst uninsured, unlicensed or disqualified because of
the possibility of imprisonment should a death occur whilst they are doing so. In
practice, it criminalises the accused twice for one blameworthy action. Unsurprisingly,
there has been criticism of the decision, since it raises issues of fair labelling and the
attribution of blame.21
C. R V HUGHES: THE SUPREME COURT
At issue in the Supreme Court was whether Hughes (and indeed,Williams) had been
correctly decided. As Lords Hughes and Toulson noted, refusing the appeal would
mean “that Mr Hughes is held criminally responsible for the death of Mr Dickinson
although on a common sense view Mr Dickinson was entirely responsible for the
15 Para 15 per Hooper LJ.
16 Para 16.
17 Quoted at para 28.
18 Ibid.
19 Para 10, emphases added. The Court also noted that had the case been a civil suit, it would have been
determined that the victim was “100% responsible” for causing the accident, and the driver “not in any
way at fault for the death” (para 22).
20 Williams at para 34.
21 See P W Ferguson, “Road traffic law reform” (2007) SLT 27 at 30; D Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s
Criminal Law, 12th edn (2008) 1111-1112; M Hirst, “Causing death by driving and other offences: a
question of balance” [2008] Crim LR 339; A P Simester and G R Sullivan, “Being there” (2012) CLJ
29; G R Sullivan and A P Simester, “Causation without limits: causing death while driving without a
licence, while disqualified, or without insurance” [2012] Crim LR 753.
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collision which resulted in his immediate death.”22 Although the Court of Appeal had
found the wording of section 3ZB to be perfectly clear, and admitting of only one
interpretation, the Supreme Court took the view that the provision was ambiguous.
Their Lordships noted: 23
It would plainly have been possible for Parliament to legislate in terms which left it beyond
doubt that a driver was made guilty of causing death whenever a car which he was driving
was involved in a fatal accident, if he were at the time uninsured, disqualified or unlicensed.
Furthermore:24
if unequivocal language . . . had been used, it would have been beyond doubt that the new
offence was committed simply as a result of the defendant being in a situation, viz a fatal
accident, whether caused by his driving or not, when committing one of the three specified
offences. If such had been the intention of Parliament, it was very easy of achievement.
Parliament did not, however, adopt language of this kind.
The court emphasised the serious nature of the offence,25 refering to it as a penal
provision “of very considerable severity”. It continued:26
The offence created is a form of homicide. To label a person a criminal killer of another is
of the greatest gravity. The defendant is at risk of imprisonment for a substantial term. Even
if, at least in a case of inadvertent lack of insurance or venial lack of licence, a sentence of
imprisonment were not to follow, the defendant would be left with a lifelong conviction for
homicide . . . to carry the stigma of criminal conviction for killing someone else, perhaps a
close relative, perhaps . . . an innocent child, is no small thing.
The offence should be interpreted in a manner favourable to the accused, since it had
to be assumed that Parliament did not intend to create a harsh offence unless there
was no other way of interpreting a provision. The principle of legality meant that
fundamental rights could not be overridden by “general or ambiguous words”.27 It
might be suggested that since imprisonment was a potential penalty – and had been
the sentence in Hughes – the case did involve a fundamental human right, namely
the right to liberty, safeguarded by article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. The Court did not regard the case as involving human rights, but nevertheless
found that unambiguous words were needed if Parliament did in fact intend to hold
that an offence was committee under section 3ZB even where the accused’s driving
had not been at fault. Given the section’s ambiguity, juries ought to be directed that an
accused could only be convicted if there was “something open to proper criticism”28
or “some act or omission . . . some element of fault”29 in the driving, and this had to
22 [2013] 1 WLR 2461 at para 6.
23 Ibid, at para 19.
24 Paras 19-20.
25 Para 26.
26 Ibid.
27 Para 27, quoting Lord Hoffmann in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Simms
[2000] 2 AC 115 at 131E.
28 Para 33.
29 Para 36.
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be something other than the mere presence of his vehicle on the road at the time of
the fatality.
D. CONCLUSION
It is, of course, open to the Westminster Parliament (road traffic being a reserved
matter)30 to amend section 3ZB in a manner that leaves no doubt that it is indeed
intended to hold an uninsured (etc) driver criminally liable for causing death, without
proof of fault in the manner of the driving. It is to be hoped that Parliament stays
its hand. The level of fault required remains unclear, since it may be less than that
necessary for the offence of careless or inconsiderate driving.31 Repeal of section 3ZB
may, therefore, be the better option given that driving whilst uninsured, unlicensed
or disqualified is already criminalised in its own right. For the time being at least, the
Supreme Court has injected some much needed fairness into the interpretation of
this provision.
Pamela Ferguson
University of Dundee
Claire McDiarmid
University of Strathclyde
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Crossing the Rubicon: Closed Hearings
in the Supreme Court
Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 1)1 deals with an eventuality which
inevitably follows from the spread of closed material procedures (“CMP”s) since their
introduction in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, namely the
use of CMP in the Supreme Court. Two questions fell to be decided: was it possible
for the Supreme Court to adopt such a procedure? And, if so, was it appropriate for
the court to adopt one in this particular case, regarding an application for the court
to set aside an order under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (the “2008 Act”)? The
order in question had prohibited financial institutions from carrying out business with
Bank Mellat, an Iranian institution accused of transferring funds for the development
of nuclear weapons, effectively preventing it from doing business in the United
Kingdom. That these questions fell to be decided in the shadow of the Supreme
Court’s robust defence of the principle of open justice in Al Rawi v The Security
30 Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5 para E1.
31 Road Traffic Act 1988 s 3. See R v Hughes [2013] 1 WLR 2461 at para 32.
1 [2013] UKSC 38.
